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Abstract:  
Even though security of payments has long been identified as an important aspect of the 
consumer payment experience, recent literature fails to appropriately assess the extent of social 
spillovers among payment users. We test for the existence and importance of such spillovers by 
analyzing whether social influence affects consumers’ perceptions of the security of payment 
instruments. Based on a 2008−2014 annual panel data survey of consumers, we find strong 
evidence of social spillovers in payment markets: others’ perceptions of security of payment 
instruments exert a positive influence on one’s own payment security perceptions. The 
significant and robust results imply that a consumer’s assessments of security converge to his 
peers’ average assessment: a 10 percent change in the divergence between one’s own security 
rating and peers’ average rating will result in a 7 percent change in one’s own rating in the next 
period. The results are robust to many specifications and do not change when we control for 
actual fraud or crime data.  
Our results indicate that spillovers rather than reflection appear to be the cause, 
although separating the two causes is very difficult (Manski 1993). In particular, the spillovers 
are stronger for people who experience an exogenous shock to security perception, people who 
have more social interactions, and younger consumers, who are more likely to be influenced by 
social media. We also examine the effects of social spillovers on payment behavior (that is, on 
decisions regarding payment adoption and use). Our results indicate that social spillovers have 
a rather limited impact on payment behavior, as others’ perceptions seem to affect one’s own 
payment behavior mainly indirectly through the effect on one’s own perceptions. 
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1. Introduction  
Over the past decade, a number of developments in retail payments have emerged. While 
traditional payment methods, such as cash and checks, remain important, the increasing 
penetration of new technologies has provided consumers with access to new, more-
sophisticated payment solutions. The vast majority of U.S. consumers hold a diversified 
portfolio of payment instruments to conduct transactions. In 2013, on average, a U.S. consumer 
held 5.2 instrument types out of nine common instruments tracked by the Survey of Consumer 
Payment Choice (Schuh and Stavins 2015a).  
A substantial and growing body of payment literature has developed on the 
determinants of adoption and use of payment methods (Koulayev et al. 2016, Schuh and Stavins 
2010, 2013, Borzekowski and Kiser 2008). More recently, attention has focused on the role of 
fraud and security in driving payment choice (Kahn and Liñares-Zegarra 2015, Schuh and 
Stavins 2015b).1 This is consistent with the Federal Reserve’s Financial Services Strategic Plan, 
which identifies security improvements as one of its top initiatives (Stavins 2013, Federal 
Reserve System 2015a,b). In almost every annual Survey of Consumer Payment Choice, 
consumers select security as the most important aspect of payments, above cost, convenience, 
and other attributes (Schuh and Stavins 2015a). Shortcomings in the safety of particular 
payments instruments, whether real or perceived, could compromise the smooth operation of 
entire retail payment systems and make payment users shift toward less-efficient means of 
payment. A deeper understanding of the determinants of safety perceptions is fundamental for 
helping policymakers and central bankers preserve consumers’ confidence in payment 
instruments.  
                                                          
1 Despite the implementation of increasingly sophisticated security standards by the payments industry, fraud and 
data breaches are still an important threat to both payment providers and consumers. Data breaches likely 
contributed to concerns about security and may affect the choice of payment providers or methods (Cheney et al. 
2012). Skimming fraud, identity theft, and security failures have compromised growing numbers of payment records 
(Sullivan 2010). In addition, the increasing number of retail payment instruments available to U.S. consumers may be 
generating new and more-sophisticated forms of payment fraud.  
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Recent literature offers insights on the importance of safety in payment choice, but fails 
to appropriately assess the importance of social spillovers among payment users. This is 
somewhat surprising, given the evidence that people’s financial choices are often influenced by 
the choices made by those around them (Bursztyn et al. 2014). Our paper attempts to fill this 
gap by (i) studying whether consumers’ perceived safety of payment instruments is influenced 
by their peers’ perceptions of safety, and (ii) examining the effects of their peers’ perceptions on 
their own adoption and use of payment instruments. The annual Survey of Consumer Payment 
Choice (SCPC) becomes an important tool in achieving these aims. The SCPC is a longitudinal 
panel of U.S. consumers conducted from 2008 to 2014. The SCPC is one of the few publicly 
available, nationally representative surveys with micro-data on payment choices and consumer 
payment behavior in the United States. The data provide a relatively good approximation of the 
norm in terms of payment behavior and therefore of the aggregate average behavior of payment 
users.  
The existing literature has relied on individuals’ perceptions to explain payment 
behavior, but has provided limited insights on how perceptions are formed. In the context of 
security, it might be expected that in addition to any direct effects of the consumer’s own 
perceptions of security, there might be additional social spillovers of others’ perceptions on 
one’s own behavior: one’s own perceptions of the risk associated with using credit cards, for 
example, might be affected by what other people think those risks are (that is, there might be 
informational cascades or consumers learning by observing others). The transmission of 
perceptions across individuals could occur either through direct interactions with peers or 
through spillovers of information transmitted via news channels and social media. For example, 
a consumer’s own perception could converge to the average perception of others after the 
consumer learned about payments security from media reports—either traditional or social—in 
addition to learning directly from his peers. Such announcements and reports could be issued 
following any external shocks involving payments security. The shocks might not affect the 
consumer directly, but rather might affect him indirectly via such spillover effects. 
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Convergence based on the consumer learning from media reports would not be 
considered a spillover, but rather would be considered reflection (Manski 1993) or a “correlated 
effect,” where both the consumer and his peers are looking at the same reports, and their 
perceptions converge based on all learning from that same report. However, learning directly 
from peers is a social spillover. We perform some tests to try to determine whether our results 
are caused by reflection or by spillovers. 
Our results provide strong evidence of the existence of social spillovers in consumers’ 
security assessments: we observe a positive influence of peers’ perceptions of security on 
consumers’ own perceptions of security. In particular, the results suggest that the consumer’s 
own perceptions of security tend to converge to the average perception, both nationally and in 
the U.S. state where the consumer lives. This result is both statistically significant and 
economically large. While the findings are consistent with social spillovers, they are also 
consistent with spillovers of information. The data do not allow us to distinguish among the 
different mechanisms through which the spillover effects occur. 
The results are robust to a number of alternative specifications that suggest no 
substantial changes in our main results. First, since individuals within a state might share some 
characteristics, such as values, norms, work ethics, consumption and payment patterns 
(contextual effects) and be affected by common shocks (correlated effects), it could give a false 
appearance of a peer effect. To mitigate these concerns, we use a number of approaches: (i) in all 
specifications we include time dummies to capture common shocks affecting all individuals 
simultaneously, (ii) in some of our models we also control for time-varying crime rates in the 
state of residence of consumer i (the variable acts as a region-year dummy to capture local 
common shocks), (iii) our models include a payment instrument fixed effect to control for 
supply-side and external shocks, which could affect perceptions for a specific payment 
instrument across all individuals living in a state.2 Second, we address the possibility that an 
                                                          
2 Other unreported specifications —available upon request— included individual fixed effects, which capture both 
(unobserved) characteristics of the individual, as well as (unobserved) characteristics of others living in the same 
state.  
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individual’s level of risk aversion could affect perceptions of security, by controlling for 
whether individuals have ever disclosed online their bank account number, their mother’s 
maiden name, or their social security number. Third, we also control for a proxy for financial 
risk aversion, which captures whether an individual has declared bankruptcy. Our findings 
remain unchanged and are consistent with recent research showing that the media influence 
consumers’ perceptions of security of payment instruments and ultimately their payment 
behavior (Kosse 2013a, Greene and Stavins 2016).3 
To test whether our results are driven by social spillovers rather than reflection or other 
contextual factors, we exploit a unique exogenous shock available in the SCPC that directly 
affects a consumer’s friend or relative significantly changes the consumer’s own perception. To 
do this, we use the incidence of identity theft on a close friend of a consumer (as an exogenous 
shock that could affect security perceptions of a person’s closest friends), while leaving the 
person unaffected. We find that a consumer whose close friend was a victim of identity theft 
tends to decrease his perception of payment security, which suggests the presence of social 
spillovers.  
Finally, we examine whether social spillovers of security perceptions directly affect 
behavior, measured as the adoption and use of payment instruments. We find some significant, 
but small, spillover network effects: contemporaneous average perception of security at the 
state level tends to increase the adoption of checks, credit cards, and online banking bill 
payment (OBBP), when controlling for own lagged perception. As for use, contemporaneous 
state average perception of security is associated with higher use of debit cards and OBBP. As a 
robustness check, we restrict our sample to new adopters of payment instruments (that is, those 
who were nonadopters during the previous year), but find only mild evidence of the influence 
of social spillovers on payment behavior: contemporaneous average perception of security at 
                                                          
3 As noted above, an influence of media is not necessarily the same as an influence of peers, although the issue is 
blurred by the presence of social media. In general, however, learning from direct contacts should be distinguished 
from learning from widely dispersed media. Our findings could be consistent with both effects. 
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the state level seems to only affect the likelihood of becoming a new adopter of checks and 
OBBP. 
Our findings provide new evidence that security assessments are likely to be influenced 
by factors beyond the socio-economic characteristics of payment users. To the best of our 
knowledge, we are the first to study how individual behavior is affected by social spillovers 
(peers’ perceptions of security) in the context of the safety of payment instruments. The results 
suggest that policymakers attempting to understand and influence perceptions of security need 
to take into consideration social norms for security perceptions.    
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature related to 
security. Section 3 describes the data and econometric techniques. Results are reported in 
Section 4. Section 5 tests whether a consumer’s peers’ perceptions of payment security have an 
effect on the consumer’s own payment behavior, and the final section summarizes the main 
conclusions.  
2. Literature review   
The literature on the effects of perceptions of security on payment behavior is not very 
extensive and the evidence is not conclusive (Rysman 2010). In regressions of payment adoption 
and use, the perceived security of a payment method was found to be significant in some cases, 
although typically less important than other characteristics of payment methods, such as ease of 
use or cost (Koulayev et al. 2016, Schuh and Stavins 2010, 2013, 2015b, Ching and Hayashi 2010). 
However, some work has found that external perceptions of risk may also influence how 
consumers pay. Kosse (2013a) finds that media coverage, such as newspaper articles on fraud, 
significantly affects debit card use in the very short term (the effect lasts only one day). Greene 
and Stavins (2016) find that people who assessed the security of debit cards after the Target 
breach was announced by the media in late 2013 rated the security of debit cards lower than 
those who assessed it before the breach was announced. Kosse (2013b) shows that consumers’ 
payment preferences are strongly affected by their perceptions of safety, which in turn are 
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primarily influenced by views on the probability of possible safety incidents occurring when 
using or carrying a payment instrument. Arango and Taylor (2009) show that perceived risk 
affects the choice of payment method, and Cope et al. (2013) find that consumers who consider 
mobile banking unsafe are less likely to adopt it. Kahn and Liñares-Zegarra (2015) show that 
experiencing identity theft or knowing someone who has experienced it influences how 
consumers pay.4 Consumer behavior in terms of privacy issues has been found to be affected 
both by endogenous factors (for example, subjective preferences) and by exogenous factors (for 
example, changes in privacy settings in user interfaces such as Facebook) (Acquisti et al. 2015).   
Consumers may adjust their perceptions based on their peers’ views. This kind of 
spillover effect has been widely explored in the context of social networks, since it may impact a 
wide array of economic and financial behavior (Miller 2015). For example, Fay et al. (2002) and 
Han and Li (2007) find that households are more likely to file for bankruptcy if they are located 
in a geographical area (for example, district or U.S. state) that had a higher filing rate in the 
previous year. Hong et al. (2004) find that social households—those that interact with their 
peers—are substantially more likely to invest in the stock market than non-social households. 
Duflo and Saez (2003) find that social network effects influence whether or not people invest in 
retirement plans, because individuals learn from others. Guiso et al. (2013) find that exposure to 
other people who strategically defaulted on their mortgages increases the individual’s own 
propensity to default strategically. 
Most of the papers cited here examine the effect of spillovers on actual behavior. In 
contrast, we examine the effect on perceptions, which in turn have also been found to affect real 
behavior. The perceptions of security measure the likelihood of either a financial/monetary loss, 
or the loss of personal information. We are attempting to measure whether and how people 
converge their perceptions, as opposed to their actual behavior, which the other papers cited 
here measure. While the mechanism through which the effect occurs may be different, the end 
result is the same: people change their behavior as a result of their peers’ views. 
                                                          
4 For a discussion related to this topic, see Hayashi and Sullivan (2013), Furletti and Smith (2005), and Sullivan (2010).  
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Network externalities in payments have typically been analyzed only on the supply side  
(Gowrisankaran and Stavins 2004), where providers of payment services, such as banks, are 
more likely to start providing services when other banks located in their area do so. But 
network externalities can also exist on the demand side in the context of the perceptions of 
security, where people are more likely to adjust their own perceptions based on what other 
people’s perceptions are. Hence, consumers may learn about security risks from the traditional 
media, as Kosse (2013a) finds, or from social media and other informal sources of information. 
Katz and Shapiro (1994) discuss the dynamics of consumer adoption decisions in the presence 
of network effects. 
More recently, Mikhed and Vogan (2015) have looked into other ways the consumer 
may react to data breaches and identity theft, such as protecting her credit file by purchasing 
insurance and credit monitoring services, and have captured the consumer’s reaction to 
environmental changes in the payment market. These authors find that consumers directly 
exposed to the data breach event responded by acquiring fraud protections available to them. 
The majority of consumers (individuals not directly affected by the breach), however, seriously 
considered fraud protection services only after they had formed a strong belief that their 
personal information had been compromised. Those authors also examined how local media 
attention to the issue of data breaches and identity theft may affect individuals and whether it 
may increase the effect of cybersecurity accidents. Their results suggest that news on identity 
theft and personal information security prompted some consumers to increase their protections 
independent of the breach, although the independent effect of the news was small.    
In this paper we test whether consumers’ perceptions of security are influenced by their 
peers’ perceptions, whether because of the shared sources of information (the “correlated effect” 
mentioned above), or because of a direct effect through interactions—in person or on social 
media—with their peers.  
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3. Data 
We use panel data consisting of the 2008−2014 annual waves of the Survey of Consumer 
Payment Choice (SCPC). The SCPC is developed by the Consumer Payments Research Center 
(CPRC) of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and administered annually to a representative 
sample of the adult U.S. population. The survey data used here include individual-level 
variables on payment choice from 2008 to 2014, including adoption and use of nine common 
payment instruments, and assessments of payment characteristics. A detailed description of the 
data can be found in Schuh and Stavins (2014, 2015a).  
Payment behavior is measured at the individual consumer level. Each year, a 
respondent is asked about his or her adoption and use of each payment instrument, and about 
his assessment of the characteristics of every payment instrument, regardless of whether the 
person has that instrument or not. The characteristics include acceptance, setup, cost, 
convenience, records, and security. The SCPC provides demographic information on age, 
gender, race, highest education level attained, marital status, ethnicity, nationality, and 
geographic region, as well as information on labor force status, household income, and the 
degree of financial responsibility within the household for every respondent. All the SCPC data 
are available to the public free of charge after the official results are published.5 Descriptive 
statistics of the main demographic variables used in our empirical models are provided in Table 
1.  
The SCPC provides consistent series of security perceptions on six payment instruments: 
checks, debit cards, credit cards, stored value cards, online banking bill payments (OBBP), and 
bank account number payments (BANP).6 Our key independent variable is the self-reported 
assessment of security. This variable rates the security of each payment method against 
                                                          
5 See http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/cprc/data-resources.htm for the available data. 
6 An online banking bill payment (OBBP) is an electronic payment made directly from the customer´s bank account to 
a vendor via her bank’s online banking website. A bank account number payment (BANP) is a payment made by 
providing the customer´s bank account number to a third party, such as her employer or a utility company. 
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permanent financial loss or unwanted disclosure of personal information under the assumption 
that a payment method has been stolen, misused, or accessed without the owner’s permission. 
The raw variable of security is coded on a Likert scale from 1 (very unsafe) to 5 (very safe).7 
Table 2 reports statistics related to variation over time of perceptions of security within and 
between U.S. states. The numbers show a higher variation within states than between states, 
suggesting heterogeneity in perceptions of security at the state level. However, because there is 
substantial variation in the perceptions of security within and between states, we incorporate 
both in our model below. 
The payments data are supplemented with state-level annual data on crime rates, for 
both violent and property crime, as well as with fraud and identity theft data from the Federal 
Trade Commission’s (FTC) Consumer Sentinel Network.8 The latter is a database of consumer 
complaints available only to law enforcement. The database includes complaints reported 
directly to the FTC, some federal agencies, some state law enforcement organizations, and some 
non-governmental organizations. The FTC report splits the complaints into two categories: 
identity theft and fraud. The complaints are then organized by the state of residence of the 
complainant, and data are reported as the incidence of complaints per 100,000 residents in the 
given state.   
4. Model 
a. Identification strategy and baseline model 
Our identification strategy attempts to address the main challenges described by Manski (1993, 
2000) to identify a causal relationship between individuals and their peers: (i) endogenously 
formed peer groups, (ii) the reflection problem and reverse causality and (iii) evidence of social 
                                                          
7 Assessments of security are available for all surveyed individuals (even nonadopters assess payment 
characteristics). 
8 The violent and property crime data are from http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/Search/Crime/State/StatebyState.cfm and 
are only available for the period 2008–2012. The FTC fraud and identity theft data can be found at 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/consumer-sentinel-network/reports. 
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interactions. First, the design of the Survey of Consumer Payment Choice (SCPC) helps to 
mitigate concerns about self-selection since the sampling design of the SCPC relies on avoiding 
sorting of equals within states in order to achieve a nationally representative and diverse 
sample of the population. This in turn allows us to work with exogenously created state-level 
groups of individuals.9 Second, there is one important feature in our empirical setting which 
helps overcome concerns with the reflection and simultaneity problem. We exploit the panel 
nature of the data to track individuals throughout their time span in the panel to examine their 
payment-behavior patterns. This approach allows us to focus on the effect of others’ perceptions 
in year t on the transition in year t+1. A more detailed discussion is provided in subsection 4.C 
below. Finally, we use a few tests to provide evidence that peer groups have influential social 
interactions: (i) sociability of individuals (more-social individuals are more likely to be directly 
affected by others’ behavior), (ii) age (younger people are more likely to be affected by social 
media) and, (iii) presence of an exogenous shock to security perception that has affected a 
person’s friends (identity theft). A detailed discussion on sociability of individuals is provided 
in subsection 4.D below.  
We estimate a standard linear-in-means model where the difference between a 
consumer’s perception of security and the average perception of the consumer’s peers living in 
state 𝑠, excluding consumer 𝑖, in year 𝑡 − 1 is a determinant of the consumer’s change in 
security perceptions from 𝑡 − 1 to 𝑡. We adapt the Ahern et al. (2014) model on peer influence to 
test for the existence of social spillovers on security assessments. Ahern et al. (2014) use survey 
results to measure peer effects on own risk aversion and trust. Although not used in the context 
of payments, that model also measures the effect of peer influence on perceptions and so is 
applicable here.10 The specification is as follows: 
                                                          
9 In addition, transition probabilities (i.e. moving from one state to other over the time) of the population have been 
relatively low in our sample over the period of 2008 to 2014. Therefore, the problem of individuals self-selecting into 
a particular U.S. state do not seem to be an important issue in our sample. 
10 Although we use a similar econometric specification to the one in Ahern et al. (2014), our empirical identification 
strategy differs from theirs as described in the previous paragraph. In particular, Ahern et al. (2014) exploit random 
assignment of MBA students to peer groups to establish peer effects among their students. They use attitudes from 
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∆𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑠,𝑡−1 − 𝑆𝐸𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅−𝑖,𝑗𝑠,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2(𝑆𝐸𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅−𝑖,𝑗𝑠,𝑡−1 − 𝑆𝐸𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅?,𝑡−1) + 
𝜃𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡 ,         (1) 
where 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡 is the perception of security of consumer 𝑖 living in state 𝑠 in year 𝑡 for payment 
method j, measured on a scale from 1 (very unsafe) to 5 (very safe). 
𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑠,𝑡−1 is the perception of security of consumer 𝑖 living in state 𝑠 in year 𝑡 − 1; 𝑆𝐸𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅−𝑖,𝑗𝑠,𝑡−1 is 
the average perception of security of all people living in state 𝑠 in year 𝑡 − 1, excluding 
consumer 𝑖. 
𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a set of control variables (age, education, income, race, gender, marital status, geographic 
region, nationality, labor force status) for individual i residing in state s in year t . 
𝜆𝑡 = 1 if year is t, 0 otherwise. 
𝛾𝑗 = 1 if payment instrument is j, 0 otherwise (a set of dummy variables), where 
j = {checks, debit cards, credit cards, stored value cards, OBBP, BANP}. 
Therefore, ∆𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡 is the change in one’s own perception of security from t–1 to t, 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑠,𝑡−1 −
𝑆𝐸𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅−𝑖,𝑗𝑠,𝑡−1 is the lagged difference between one’s own perception of security and the state 
average, and 𝑆𝐸𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅−𝑖,𝑗𝑠,𝑡−1 − 𝑆𝐸𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅?,𝑡−1 is the lagged difference between the state average and the 
national average. The coefficient 𝛽1 is the degree of adjustment in one’s own perception of 
security as a result of the measured divergence from the state average, and the coefficient 𝛽2 is 
the degree of adjustment in one’s own perception of security as a result of the measured 
divergence between the state average and the national perception of security. Therefore, if a 
person’s views are very different from those living around him, and if the perceptions of those 
living in his state are very different from the perceptions of the rest of the country, he might be 
more likely to change his perceptions in the following period. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the students prior to the start of the MBA program to estimate a causal relationship between the predetermined 
attitudes of a person’s peers and the person’s own attitudes after a year in the MBA program. Finally, they use self-
reported friendship and professional contacts to verify that students have influential social interactions. 
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This regression captures the change over time in the perceptions of each consumer based 
on the similarity of her perceptions to her peers’ average perception. A negative and statistically 
significant 𝛽1 indicates positive social spillovers within a state, while a negative and statistically 
significant 𝛽2 indicates positive social spillovers nationally.11 Hence, a consumer who reports 
that a particular payment instrument is safer (less safe) than her peers’ average perception of its 
safety in 𝑡 − 1 might adjust her perceptions downward (upward). Survey wave dummies (𝜆𝑡) 
are employed to control for shocks common to all consumers in our sample, and payment 
instrument dummies (𝛾𝑗) capture payment instrument fixed effects.12 Standard errors are 
clustered at the individual level across all our models to account for the correlation of errors 
over time within the same individual.    
b. Responding to positive and negative opinions 
“Bad news travels fast,” so negative opinions are likely to spread faster than positive opinions 
and ultimately affect consumer perceptions. If a consumer already has a more secure 
assessment of a payment instrument than the average assessment/opinions of her peers 
(𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1 ≥ 𝑆𝐸𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅−𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1), we would expect the downward adjustment on her perceptions to be 
more powerful. Alternatively, a consumer with a riskier view than that of his peers (𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1 <
𝑆𝐸𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅−𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1) might adjust his perceptions upward, but presumably more gradually. In order to 
test whether this is the case, we estimate an interaction model that allows for the possibility of 
heterogeneity in the “measured divergence from the peers’ perceptions” coefficient such that:13 
                                                          
11 As mentioned above, the effect could arise from the diffusion of information used to form perceptions. 
12 The data suggest that mean reversion is unlikely to explain our results, as the variation over time of the perceived 
riskiness of payment instruments does not seem to follow a clear pattern, so any external factors are likely to have 
affected perceptions in a systematic way. Figure A1 and Table A1 in the appendix illustrate variation in the 
perception of security, both across states and over time within a state, based on credit card security ratings. The map 
in Figure A1 shows a ranking of states based on perceptions of security of credit cards: 1 represents states in the 
lowest 20th percentile of the distribution (very risky) and 5 represents states in the top 20th percentile of the 
distribution (very safe). The high perceived risk category is highlighted in dark red, and the low perceived risk 
category is highlighted in pale pink. Table A1 shows that there is a substantial amount of variation in the relative 
security perception over time. 
13 See the appendix for the details of the transformation of our base specification. We have omitted the state minus 
national difference from this equation in the paper for simplicity, although it is included in the regression. 
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∆𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖j𝑠𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛿1𝑁𝐸𝐺 + δ2(𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖j𝑠,𝑡−1 − 𝑆𝐸𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅−𝑖,j𝑠,𝑡−1) + δ3[NEG ∗ (𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖j𝑠,𝑡−1 − 𝑆𝐸𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅−𝑖,j𝑠,𝑡−1)] +
𝜃𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖j𝑠𝑡 .          (2) 
Equation (2) can be rewritten as follows (see the appendix for the details on this 
transformation):  
∆𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖j𝑠𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛿4𝑁𝐸𝐺 + 𝛿5[𝑁𝐸𝐺 ∗ (𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖j𝑠,𝑡−1 − 𝑆𝐸𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅−𝑖,j𝑠,𝑡−1)] + 𝛿6[𝑃𝑂𝑆 ∗ (𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖j𝑠,𝑡−1 −
𝑆𝐸𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅−𝑖,j𝑠,𝑡−1)] + 𝜃𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖j𝑠𝑡 ,           (3) 
where ∆𝑆𝐸𝐶 is individual i’s change in the perception of the security of payment instrument j, α 
is the constant term, NEG is a dummy variable capturing whether a consumer perceives that a 
payment instrument is riskier than her peers’ views in t − 1, and POS is a dummy variable 
capturing whether a consumer perceives that a payment instrument is safer than her peers’ 
views of that payment instrument in t − 1.  
𝑁𝐸𝐺 ∗ (𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖j𝑠,𝑡−1 − 𝑆𝐸𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅−𝑖,j𝑠,𝑡−1) and 𝑃𝑂𝑆 ∗ (𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖j𝑠,𝑡−1 − 𝑆𝐸𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅−𝑖,j𝑠,𝑡−1) represent the interaction 
terms between the two groups and the measured divergence from the peers’ perceptions 
indicator, and 𝜀 is the error term. Based on the above observations, we test the extent to which a 
consumer’s perceptions of security are influenced by good or bad opinions about the security of 
payment instruments from her peers (H0: 𝛿5  =  𝛿6). A rejection of the null hypothesis would 
provide support for this hypothesis. Equation (3) is estimated via OLS with robust standard 
errors clustered at individual level.14   
c. Reflection vs. spillovers 
Manski (1993) defined “reflection,” to indicate a situation where the same behavior is observed 
among members of the population but it is not clear whether the behavior of some individuals 
is influencing the behavior of others. To state it another way, the term “reflection” in this 
                                                          
14 The results remain unchanged when standard errors are clustered at the state level rather than at the individual 
level. 
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context denotes that the behavior of a person in a group resembles or reflects the behavior of 
others in his group but is not caused by that behavior. 
It is difficult to separate the contemporaneous and reciprocal influences of others on an 
individual from the influence of the individual on the others. Manski (1993) finds that the only 
way to determine whether there is causality in behavior (rather than just reflection) is to have 
information specifying the composition of the reference groups. If this information is available, 
social spillovers may be inferred based on the relationship between the variables defining the 
reference groups and those directly affecting the outcomes. Determining whether there is 
causality or only correlation in behavior is difficult, and is more likely to be possible if the 
variables defining the reference groups and those directly affecting the outcomes are 
moderately related in the population. 
The reflection problem primarily affects cross-sectional models (Manski 1993) and this 
causes the regressors to be linearly dependent, and no identification is possible. There is one 
important feature in our empirical setting that helps overcome concerns with the reflection and 
simultaneity problem. We use the panel nature of the data to track individuals throughout their 
time span in the panel to examine their payment-behavior patterns. This approach allows us to 
focus on the effect of others’ perceptions in year t on the transition in year t+1. The reflection 
problem is therefore less severe, since others’ perceptions are already determined at the time of 
the transition from t-1 to t. Hence, others’ perceptions of security are predetermined with 
respect to the subsequent perception of security of the individual instead of being jointly 
contemporaneously determined and may break the reflection problem. Other studies such as 
Cingano and Rosolia (2012), Schmutte (2015), and Smith et al. (2015) have also used a similar 
time-sequencing argument to address the reflection problem.15  
                                                          
15 An alternative solution to address the Manski’s reflection problem relies on the use of instrumental variable 
techniques. In our case, it requires an instrument that is correlated with the divergence between one’s own security 
rating and peers’ average rating but does not have a direct impact on one’s own security rating. We use as instrument 
an indicator variable capturing whether a respondent was born in another state from his current state of residence, 
and therefore might have priors that are different from his peers, but it is unlikely that the priors affect the change in 
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d. Sociability of the individuals 
If social network effects are the driving force in affecting one’s own perception of payment 
security, we might also expect that more-sociable individuals would converge more quickly to 
their peers’ views, as they interact with others more, and therefore have more opportunities to 
learn what others think, than those who are less sociable. We test this hypothesis by using data 
from the RAND American Life Panel to proxy for social interaction between individuals. We 
focus on a variable capturing sociability: “How often do you get together with [your neighbors] 
just to chat or for a social visit?” Based on the answer we classify the intensity of social 
interaction as HIGH=1 if more than one time (which is the median value of the distribution) and 
LOW=0 if one time or ‘almost never’ or ‘never’ get together. We estimate an interaction model 
similar to the positive and negative views model above, as follows: 
∆𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖j𝑠𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝜗1 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝑊 + 𝜗2[𝐿𝑂𝑊 ∗ (𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖j𝑠,𝑡−1 − 𝑆𝐸𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅−𝑖,j𝑠,𝑡−1)] + 𝜗3[𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 ∗ (𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖j𝑠,𝑡−1 −
𝑆𝐸𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅−𝑖,j𝑠,𝑡−1)] + 𝜃𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡 .           (4) 
5. Results 
a. Social spillovers 
Table 3a reports regression results of estimating equation (1) using OLS. We use cluster-robust 
standard errors at the individual level to account for any serial correlation within 
individuals over time. The numbers reported in the table are the marginal effects based on 
normalized perceptions of security. Therefore, the results are interpreted as the effect of a one-
standard-deviation change in the divergence from the peers’ average perception.16   
We estimated equation (1) for each payment instrument j separately, but could not reject 
pooling all the payment instruments. Therefore, Table 3a and most of the subsequent tables 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
her own perceptions as they are already reflected in the perceptions. Results also support our findings about the 
existence of social spillovers and are available from the authors upon request.   
16 See Table A2 in the appendix for the degree of divergence from the peers’ standard deviations. 
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report the results for all payment instruments. To account for the variance within and between 
states, the model includes the divergence of individual i’s perceptions of payment method j 
from the average perception in state s, and the divergence from the average perception in state s 
from the national average perception. Note that all the state-level averages exclude individual i 
in order to measure the external effects of one’s peers’ perceptions on one’s own perceptions 
(denoted as –i in the model). 
The results suggest the presence of significant social spillovers in payment perceptions.17 
The effect of the degree of divergence from regional (state) average spillovers is greater than the 
effect of the degree of the divergence between state and national averages, suggesting that 
consumers are more likely to interact with and/or get information from peers who are located 
closer to them. However, both within-state and between-states spillover effects are statistically 
significant. Table 3b shows the elasticities derived from the base model reported in Table 3a. 
The interpretation of the results is as follows:  
 A 10 percent increase in the distance between i’s security rating for payment j and the 
average rating of i’s peers’ living in state s in t − 1 will result in a 7.0 percent convergence 
in i’s rating in the next period. 
 A 10 percent increase in the degree of divergence between the average rating in i’s state 
for payment j and the national average rating in t − 1 will result in a 6.84 percent 
convergence in i’s rating next period. 
Therefore, consumers converge their perceptions of the security of payment instruments based 
both on the perceptions of others living in their state and on the perceptions of others outside 
their state. 
                                                          
17 As a robustness check, we use fixed effect models to investigate changes in perceptions after controlling for any 
time-invariant characteristics of the individual and her peers. However, since the dependent variable in the 
regressions is the change in security perception, the individual fixed effects are less intuitive to interpret, as they 
would be controlling for trends in individual changes in security perceptions. The results remain unchanged, and 
estimation results are available from the authors. 
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Table 4 extends the model reported in Table 3a by including exogenous risk measures: 
state-level crime rates in the state of residence of consumer 𝑖, a proxy for the individual’s risk 
aversion measured as the disclosure online of sensitive personal information by the consumer 
(social security number, bank account number, mother’s maiden name), and the individual’s 
financial risk-taking behavior, measured by whether or not the individual has ever been 
involved in a bankruptcy process. All of these measures could influence the individual’s 
perception of the security of any payment instrument.18 Including these exogenous variables in 
the model allows us to test whether the perceptions of security are in fact capturing other 
effects. We find that after controlling for each of these factors, the main results remain 
unchanged. None of the factors seem to affect the perceptions of security.19,20 Convergence to 
national-level perceptions was omitted for simplicity, but adding it to the models did not alter 
our findings. 
b. Positive and negative opinions 
It could be argued that negative opinions are likely to spread faster than positive ones, so we 
would expect a stronger adjustment downward if consumers are more positive than their peers 
in their perception of the security of a payment instrument. If consumers’ perceptions  are more 
negative than those of their peers, they may also adjust, but presumably more gradually. 
Results in Table 5 separate positive deviation of a consumer’s average perception of security 
from the regional average and negative deviation of a consumer’s average perception of 
security from the regional average (see equation (3) above). Our results suggest that social 
spillovers are present in both cases—when a consumer’s perception is lower and when it is 
                                                          
18 Types of crimes included in the crime rate are: (i) Violent crimes: murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated 
assault; (ii) Property crimes: burglary, larceny-theft and motor vehicle theft. Data are measured on a state level in per 
capita terms. The FTC data include fraud and identity theft complaints. 
19 We checked the result that state-level crime does not affect the change of perceptions of security with a correlation 
analysis between average perceptions of individual payment instruments and average crime indicators at the state 
level (see Table A3 in the appendix). There is a negative correlation (as might be expected), but the correlation is very 
low. In other words, perceptions seem to capture some of the safety concerns related to crime, but the impact of crime 
on perceptions is marginal. 
20 Similar results were obtained using a fixed effects model. Results are available from the authors. 
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higher than average: both 𝛿5 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿6 are statistically significant, and the hypothesis that positive 
and negative deviations have the same effect on convergence in perceptions cannot be rejected.  
c. Different degrees of social interaction  
As an extension to our previous analysis (see equation (4) above), we test whether more-
sociable individuals tend to converge more quickly to the state average. Based on a variable 
capturing the intensity of social interactions by individuals in our sample, we find that 
individuals with a higher level of social interactions tend to adjust their perceptions of security 
more quickly (𝜗3 is greater than 𝜗2 in absolute value), although the difference is not statistically 
significant. Results are reported in Table 6. These results should be interpreted with caution, 
because the data on sociability are available only for 2012. 
A potentially important transmission mechanism for the spillover effects is social media. 
Because younger people are more likely than older people to be connected via social media, we 
tested whether the spillover effects are stronger for younger people. We split the sample and 
estimated the base model separately for people under age 35 and for people over age 55. We 
also estimated the model separately for state effects, census region effects, and national effects. 
As the results in Table 7 show, the social spillover effects are stronger for the younger cohort in 
every specification, indicating that younger people are more likely to converge to the average 
perception of their peers, a result that seems intuitive, given the effect of social media. This 
relationship between age and social spillovers holds for the national, census region, and state-
level models. 
Separating social spillovers and contextual effects is challenging. According to Ahern et 
al. (2014), “…To do so [separating social spillovers and contextual effects] requires the highly 
unusual occurrence of an exogenous shock to the attitudes of a person’s peers, while leaving the 
person unaffected...” (page 3215). As an additional test to provide more corroborating evidence 
about the existence of social spillovers on payment perceptions, we use a proxy to capture an 
exogenous shock that could affect the security perceptions of a person’s closest friends, while 
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leaving the person unaffected. Using survey responses from the SCPC panel, we build a 
variable that indicates whether a close friend of an individual has been the victim of identity 
theft. This variable measures the extent to which a negative security shock of a close friend 
could influence individual perceptions. We follow Kosse (2013b) and use a random-effects 
ordered logistic model. The dependent variable is the measure of perception of security ranging 
from 1 to 5, where a higher rating corresponds to a higher level of perceived security. 
The model is estimated separately for each payment instrument, because the effects of 
an identity theft occurring to a friend vary by type of payment.21 The results in Table 8 show 
that a consumer whose close friend had been a victim of identity theft tends to decrease his 
perception of payment security for some payment instruments. In particular, marginal effects 
for our key variable “ID Theft” suggest that the security perception of checks, debit cards, and 
BANP are negatively correlated with negative security shocks occurring to a friend. For 
example, knowing a victim of identity theft tends to reduce the probability of assessing checks 
as “Very secure” or “Secure,” and increases the probability of assessing checks as “Risky” or 
”Very risky.” Our results support our previous findings indicating that social influence seems 
to matter when individual perceptions are formed. This is an indication that our results are not 
driven by reflection or other contextual effects.  
Interestingly, the effect of identity theft on a friend is significant for payment 
instruments that are directly connected to a person’s bank account. The reason could be that 
bank accounts are more vulnerable to identity theft, in contrast with credit cards, which are 
more likely to be stolen, lost, or mishandled in terms of the credit card number itself, but not in 
terms of one’s user identity data being stolen. 
                                                          
21 We are especially interested in security assessments of payment cards, because the Federal Reserve Payments 
Study shows that the fraud rate for payment cards is much higher than the fraud rate for check or ACH (Federal 
Reserve System 2013). In addition, larger payment card fraud cases typically receive considerable publicity, making 
consumers more aware of those cases compared with check- or ACH-related cases. 
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d. Correlation of perceptions across payment instruments 
To test whether people tend to reduce/improve their security assessments of all other payment 
methods jointly even when there is an external shock that directly affects only one payment 
instrument, we tested whether changes in perceptions are correlated across payment 
instruments. Correlation coefficients indicate that changes in security ratings from year to year 
are not highly correlated across different payment instruments. However, in regressions of the 
change in the security rating of a given payment instrument on changes in the security rating of 
all other payment instruments, most of the coefficients are positive and highly significant (the 
results are available from the authors). Therefore, a change in the rating of one instrument is a 
strong predictor of changes in the ratings of other instruments. Year effects, as measured by 
year dummy coefficients, are also significant. These results suggest that people form their 
perceptions of security for all payment instruments simultaneously, and may therefore 
converge all their perceptions to those of their peers, even if they learn about perceptions 
pertaining directly to only a single payment instrument. 
e. Role of geography 
In the main specification (equation (1), Tables 3a and 3b), both the state-level effects and the 
national-level effects are included. In addition to the pooled model used as our main 
specification, we also estimated the model separately for various geographic regions: [1] only 
the divergence from the state average was included, [2] only the divergence from the census 
region average was included, and [3] only the divergence from the national average was 
included. We find that if entered separately in regressions, national spillover effects are stronger 
than census region effects, which in turn are stronger than state-level effects. While all the 
spillover effects are statistically significant, the magnitude increases for broader geographic 
regions. This is because geographic effects are likely to be nested: the state effects are nested in 
the census region effects, which in turn are nested in the national effects. 
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It is feasible that people living in larger states (in terms of their geographic area) would 
be more isolated from other states, and therefore would exhibit a larger degree of convergence 
to the perceptions of others living in their state. In other words, a large state like Texas may 
constitute a strong network, while a small state like Delaware may be more tied to other states 
in the region and therefore create a weaker network for social spillover effects. We tested 
whether an individual’s deviation from his regional average is affected by the size of his state 
and by the distance from other states. To test this, we included a measure of the area of each 
state (raw and in log form) and a measure of the distance from the neighboring states in the 
main specification. However, neither the area nor the distance measures were significant 
predictors of the deviation from the state average. The size of the state is not a significant factor 
overall, and the main relationship between an individual’s change in perception and the 
deviation from the regional average holds even when we control for it. 
f. Robustness checks  
As a robustness check, we performed a battery of additional tests to complement the main 
results. Table 9 shows the results of three models estimated under alternative specifications of 
the original model (equation (1)).  Model 1 shows the results without demographic or other 
control variables, as most of them were found to be statistically insignificant in Table 3a. Model 
2 includes the demographic and other control variables, but omits the year effects. Model 3 
excludes all demographic and control variables, as well as the year dummies. The effect of the 
divergence from the average state perception and the effect of the divergence between the state 
and the national average for all three models remain almost exactly the same as in the original 
specification (Table 3a), and the adjusted R2 remains unchanged. 
6. Social spillovers and payment behavior  
Above, we show that there is evidence for social spillovers, whereby others’ perceptions of 
the security of payment instruments affect a consumer’s own perception of security. In this 
section, we test whether others’ perceptions of payment security have a direct effect on a 
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consumer’s payment behavior, in addition to any indirect effects of the consumer’s perception of 
security on his or her own behavior. We measure payment behavior with two variables: the 
adoption of each payment instrument, and then the use of the payment instrument conditional 
on adoption. We apply the two-step Heckman methodology as in  Schuh and Stavins (2010, 
2013) and in Kahn and Liñares-Zegarra (2015) to estimate adoption and use of each payment 
instrument, but we include a consumer’s peers’ perception of security as an explanatory 
variable. 
For each payment instrument, we estimate own adoption and use at time t as a function of 
own perceptions (including security) at time 𝑡 − 1, and of the average perception of security of 
the consumer’s peers at time 𝑡 − 1. Both own perceptions and others’ perception are lagged, and 
therefore all are exogenous at time t. The majority of previous studies of the relationship 
between perception and payment behavior (including the ones cited here) have relied on 
concurrent surveys measuring both perceptions and behavior at time t. Consequently, there has 
been an uncertainty about the direction of causality: do perceptions influence consumer choice 
or are perceptions simply ex post rationalizations by consumers of their own payment 
behavior? We are able to exploit panel data on perception and consumer payment choice to 
show that perceptions elicited in one round of surveys have mild but significant effects on 
subsequent changes in behavior. 
Table 10 shows the regression results. For the sake of brevity, we report only the 
coefficients of perceptions. Control variables follow Schuh and Stavins (2010) and include age, 
education, marital status, number of household members, ethnicity, race, gender, income, work 
status, degree of financial responsibility within the family, house ownership, number of other 
adopted payment instruments, and year dummies. We find some statistically significant, but 
small in magnitude, social spillovers effects: state averages of security perception have only a 
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very mild direct effect on a consumer’s behavior. Therefore, the spillovers affect payment 
behavior indirectly, through an effect on a consumer’s own perceptions.22  
7. Conclusions  
Payment security is central to ensuring the smooth operation of payment systems. Changes in 
social environments, such as peers’ views or opinions, could lead to changes in the way 
consumers perceive certain payment instruments in terms of security. Our results suggest that it 
could be the case that when a consumer’s peers’ perceived security of a particular payment 
instrument is high, that is, when they consider the payment instrument very safe, the 
consumer’s own perception of the security of that payment instrument increases in the 
following period. The effect is strong—a 10 percent increase in the extent of the divergence in 
the consumer’s security rating from that of her peers leads to a 7 percent change in her own 
security rating in the next period. In contrast, we find limited evidence of the impact of social 
spillovers on payment behavior (adoption and use), implying that the social spillovers of peers’ 
perceptions affect one’s own behavior only indirectly through the effect on own perceptions. 
The results remain robust to alternative models, specifications, and endogeneity concerns. 
The results of this paper demonstrate that consumers’ assessments of payment security 
can potentially be influenced by the opinions of others with whom they interact, whether 
through direct contact or through social media. This has interesting implications for the 
payment industry. For example, customers with negative perceptions toward certain (or new) 
payment instruments may alter their views about that instrument’s  security based on the social 
norms or the views of those with whom they interact, and this effect can be strengthened by the 
presence of social media, which are national in scope. The existence of such spillovers in 
                                                          
22 As a robustness check, we also test the influence of state averages of security on the probability of being a new 
adopter in year t (conditional on having been a nonadopter in year t − 1). Results reported in Table A4 in the 
appendix suggest that state averages of security tend to increase the probability of being a new adopter of checks and 
OBBP, when controlling for one’s own lagged perception. Because the survey questions related to stored value card 
(SVC) adoption changed in 2011, the negative effect on SVC adoption may not reflect the spillover effects, but instead 
may be caused by the changes in the questionnaire. 
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payment markets could lead to positive or negative changes in the aggregate perception of 
security for the whole payment system and could ultimately affect the adoption and use of 
payment instruments. 
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Table 1: Sample demographics 
 
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
      
Age 13,165 50.38 14.97 16 93 
Education: High school 13,165 0.16 0.36 0 1 
Education: Some college 13,165 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Education: College degree 13,165 0.25 0.44 0 1 
Education: Post-graduate studies 13,165 0.19 0.40 0 1 
Married 13,165 0.64 0.48 0 1 
Income: $25,000 – $49,999 13,133 0.25 0.44 0 1 
Income: $50,000 – $74,999 13,133 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Income: $75,000 – $99,000 13,133 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Income: over $100,000 13,133 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Male 13,165 0.44 0.50 0 1 
White 13,164 0.85 0.36 0 1 
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Table 2: Within and between state variations in security perceptions (2008–2014) 
 
Payment Instrument Variation at state level Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Sample 
Checks Overall 3.02 0.31 2 4 
Number of States: 49 
Years: 2008–2014  
Between 
 
0.17 2.71 3.49 
 
Within 
 
0.26 2.11 4.25 
       
Debit Cards Overall 3.00 0.35 1 4 
Number of States: 49 
Years: 2008–2014  
Between 
 
0.19 2.40 3.44 
 
Within 
 
0.29 1.60 3.98 
       
Credit Cards Overall 3.21 0.40 2 5 
Number of States: 49 
Years: 2008–2014  
Between 
 
0.21 2.79 3.81 
 
Within 
 
0.35 1.57 4.57 
       
Stored Value Cards Overall 2.75 0.41 1 4 
Number of States: 49 
Years: 2008–2014  
Between 
 
0.23 1.64 3.26 
 
Within 
 
0.34 1.20 4.28 
       
OBBP Overall 3.30 0.36 2 5 
Number of States: 49 
Years: 2009–2014  
Between 
 
0.24 2.82 4.12 
 
Within 
 
0.26 2.33 4.53 
       BANP Overall 2.64 0.34 1.67 3.8 
Number of States: 49 
Years: 2009–2014  
Between 
 
0.16 2.31 3.03 
 
Within 
 
0.31 1.72 3.64 
Note: Hawaii (HI), Puerto Rico (PR), and Wyoming (WY) were excluded from the sample because of the 
small number of usable observations. 
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Table 3a: An individual’s changes in perceptions of security on divergence from the state 
and national averages (marginal effects) 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ∆𝑺𝑬𝑪𝒊𝒋𝒔𝒕  
𝑺𝑬𝑪𝒊,𝒋,𝒔,𝒕−𝟏 − 𝑺𝑬𝑪̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ −𝒊,𝒋𝒔,𝒕−𝟏 -0.596*** 
 
(0.01) 
𝑺𝑬𝑪̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝒋,𝒔,𝒕−𝟏 − 𝑺𝑬𝑪̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝒋,𝒕−𝟏 
-0.058*** 
(0.004) 
Age 0.006 
 
(0.00) 
Education: High school 0.005 
 
(0.04) 
Education: Some college 0.003 
 
(0.04) 
Education: College degree 0.000 
 
(0.04) 
Education: Post-graduate studies 0.000 
 
(0.04) 
Married -0.009 
 
(0.01) 
Income: $25,000 – $49,999 -0.002 
 
(0.02) 
Income: $50,000 – $74,999 -0.000 
 
(0.02) 
Income: $75,000 – $99,000 0.012** 
 
(0.02) 
Income: over $100,000 0.016** 
 
(0.02) 
Male  0.038*** 
 (0.01) 
White -0.008 
 (0.02) 
N 44379 
Year Fixed Effects YES 
Payment Instrument Fixed Effects YES 
F-test (Wald test) 605.18*** 
Adjusted R-squared  0.347 
 
Note: Marginal effects from OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is individual i’s change in raw 
perception of security for payment j from wave 𝑡 − 1 to wave 𝑡. 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑗,𝑠,𝑡−1 − 𝑆𝐸𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅−𝑖,𝑗,𝑠,𝑡−1 is the difference between 
the individual’s raw perception of security and average raw perception of security in the state of residence 
(regional).  
𝑆𝐸𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅?,𝑠,𝑡−1 − 𝑆𝐸𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅?,𝑡−1 is the difference between the average raw perception of security in the state of residence in 
wave t − 1 and the national average in wave t − 1. Variables are normalized so that coefficients represent the 
standard deviation changes for a one-standard-deviation-change in independent variables. Explanatory variables are 
individual i’s characteristics, which are exogenous with respect to perceptions of security such as age, education, 
income, gender, and marital status. Standard errors clustered at individual and payment instrument level are in 
parentheses. Significance at the 5%, and 1% level is indicated by ** and ***. 
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Table 3b: An individual’s changes in perceptions of security by divergence from the 
regional and national averages (elasticities) 
 
 
The table below reports elasticities based on the results in Table 3a. The numbers can be interpreted as follows:  
 
 A 10 percent increase in the distance between i’s security rating for payment j and i’s peers’ rating in t − 1 
will result in a 7.0 percent reduction in i’s rating in the next period.   
 A 10 percent increase in the distance between average rating in i’s state for payment j and the national 
rating in t − 1 will result in a 6.84 percent reduction in i’s rating next period. 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ∆𝒍𝒏(𝑺𝑬𝑪𝒊,𝒋,𝒔,𝒕) ≈  percentage change in i’s security 
perceptions of payment method j 
𝒍𝒏 𝑺𝑬𝑪𝒊𝒋𝒔,𝒕−𝟏 − 𝒍𝒏 𝑺𝑬𝑪̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ −𝒊,𝒋𝒔,𝒕−𝟏 -0.700*** 
(0.01) 
𝒍𝒏 𝑺𝑬𝑪̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ −𝒊,𝒋𝒔,𝒕−𝟏 − 𝒍𝒏 𝑺𝑬𝑪̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝒋,𝒕−𝟏 -0.684*** 
 
(0.09) 
N 44379 
Year Fixed Effects YES 
Control Variables YES 
Payment Instrument Fixed Effects YES 
F-test (Wald test) 311.136*** 
Adjusted R-squared  0..361 
 
Note: Coefficients from OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is individual i’s percentage change in raw 
perception of security from wave 𝑡 − 1 to wave 𝑡.  
𝑙𝑛 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑠,𝑡−1 − 𝑙𝑛 𝑆𝐸𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅−𝑖,𝑗𝑠,𝑡−1 is the difference in logs between individual i’s raw perception of security and the 
average raw perception of security in the state of residence s for payment method j.  
𝑙𝑛 𝑆𝐸𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅−𝑖,𝑗𝑠,𝑡−1  − 𝑙𝑛 𝑆𝐸𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅?,𝑡−1 is the difference in logs between a state’s average raw perception of security and the 
national average in wave t − 1. Variables are normalized so that coefficients represent the standard deviation 
changes for a one-standard-deviation-change in independent variables. Explanatory variables are individual 
characteristics,  which are thought to be exogenous to perceptions of security, such as age, education, income, and 
marital status. Standard errors clustered at individual and payment instrument level are in parentheses. Significance 
at the 5%, and 1% level is indicated by ** and ***. 
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Table 4: An individual’s changes in perceptions of security by divergence from the regional averages, controlling for 
crime and the individual´s risk behavior  
 
 
 
      
 Dependent Variable: ∆𝑺𝑬𝑪𝒊𝒋𝒔𝒕 
 
Regional 
crime per 
capita  
Ever disclosed online: 
Social Security Number 
Ever disclosed 
online: Bank 
Account Number 
Ever disclosed online: 
Mother’s maiden name 
Declared 
bankruptcy 
𝑺𝑬𝑪𝒊𝒋𝒔,𝒕−𝟏 − 𝑺𝑬𝑪̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ −𝒊,𝒋𝒔,𝒕−𝟏 -0.580*** -0.576*** -0.576*** -0.576*** -0.574*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Crime and Risk Behaviort-1 0.004 -0.003 0.015*** -0.010** 0.008 
 
(.48) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
N 37074 41203 41191 41180 40525 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Payment Instrument Fixed 
Effects 
YES YES YES YES YES 
Additional Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
F-test (Wald test) 656.9*** 705.7*** 705.5*** 705.8*** 687.0*** 
Adjusted R-squared  0.336 0.331 0.331 0.331 0.330 
      
 
Note: Coefficients from OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is individual i’s change in raw perception of security of payment method j from wave 
𝑡 − 1 to wave 𝑡. 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑠,𝑡−1 − 𝑆𝐸𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅−𝑖,𝑗𝑠,𝑡−1 is the difference between individual i’s raw perception of security for payment instrument j and the average raw 
perception of security in the state of residence s (regional) or  the country (national) in wave 𝑡 − 1. Variables are normalized so that coefficients represent the 
standard deviation changes for a one-standard-deviation-change in independent variables. Crime is measured per capita in the individual´s state of residence. It 
includes: (i) Violent crimes: murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault; (ii) Property crimes: burglary, larceny-theft and motor vehicle theft. Risk 
behavior is a dummy variable that captures whether the individual is risk-averse by disclosing personal information on the internet (for example, social security 
number, bank account number, or mother’s maiden name). The last control, “declared bankruptcy,” also attempts to capture risky behavior from a financial 
perspective. Additional control variables includes characteristics that are thought to be exogenous to perceptions of security such as age, education, income, and 
marital status. Standard errors clustered at individual and payment instrument level are in parentheses. Significance at the 5%, and 1% level is indicated by ** 
and ***. 
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Table 5: Influence of negative and positive news on changes in perceptions of 
security  
  
∆𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖j𝑠𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛿4𝑁𝐸𝐺 + 𝛿5[𝑁𝐸𝐺 ∗ (𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖j𝑠,𝑡−1 − 𝑆𝐸𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅−𝑖,j𝑠,𝑡−1)]
+ 𝛿6[𝑃𝑂𝑆 ∗ (𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖,j𝑠,𝑡−1 − 𝑆𝐸𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅−𝑖,j𝑠,𝑡−1)] + 𝜃𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ∆𝑺𝑬𝑪𝒊𝒋𝒔𝒕 
𝛿4 -0.005 
 
(0.03) 
 
𝛿5 -0.335*** 
 
(0.02) 
 
𝛿6 -0.319*** 
 
(0.02) 
  
𝑭 − 𝒕𝒆𝒔𝒕    𝑯𝟎: 𝛿5 = 𝛿6 1.11 
  
N 44379 
Year Fixed Effects YES 
Payment Instrument Fixed Effects YES 
Control Variables YES 
F-test (Wald test) 357.0*** 
Adjusted R-squared  0.333 
 
Note: Coefficients from OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is individual i’s change in raw perception of 
security of payment method j from wave 𝑡 − 1 to wave 𝑡.   Variables are normalized so that coefficients represent 
the standard deviation changes for a one-standard-deviation-change in the independent variables.  Standard errors 
clustered at individual level are in parentheses. Significance at the 5%, and 1% level is indicated by ∗∗ and ***.
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Table 6: Influence of sociability on changes in perceptions of security 
 
 
 
 
∆𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖j𝑠𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝜗1 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝑊 + 𝜗2[𝐿𝑂𝑊 ∗ (𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖j𝑠,𝑡−1 − 𝑆𝐸𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅−𝑖,j𝑠,𝑡−1)] + 𝜗3[𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 ∗
(𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖j𝑠,𝑡−1 − 𝑆𝐸𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅−𝑖,j𝑠,𝑡−1)] + 𝜃𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡  
     
 
 
 
Number of times get together with people (High/Low) 
𝜗1 -0.004 
 
(0.04) 
  
𝜗2 -0.333*** 
 
(0.03) 
  
𝜗3 -0.473*** 
 
(0.02) 
  
𝑭 − 𝒕𝒆𝒔𝒕    𝑯𝟎: 𝜗2 = 𝜗3 0.18 
  
N 8589 
Year Fixed Effects YES 
Payment Instrument Fixed Effects YES 
Control Variables YES 
F-test (Wald test) 151.7*** 
Adjusted R-squared  0.340 
 
Note: Coefficients from OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is individual i’s change in raw 
perception of security of payment method j from wave 𝑡 − 1 to wave 𝑡.   Variables are normalized so that 
coefficients represent the standard deviation changes for a one-standard-deviation-change in the independent 
variables.  Standard errors clustered at individual level are in parentheses. Significance at the 5%, and 1% level 
is indicated by ∗∗ and ***. 
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Table 7: An individual’s changes in perceptions of security based on divergence from 
the regional and national averages, age group comparison (marginal effects) 
 
 Dependent Variable: ∆𝑺𝑬𝑪𝒊𝒋𝒔𝒕 
 Age 18–34 Age >=55 
 State 
Census 
Region 
National State 
Census 
Region 
National 
𝑺𝑬𝑪𝒊𝒋𝒔,𝒕−𝟏 − 𝑺𝑬𝑪̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ −𝒊,𝒋𝒔,𝒕−𝟏 
-0.624*** 
(0.02) 
-0.626*** 
(0.02) 
-0.628*** 
(0.02) 
-0.583*** 
(0.02) 
-0.586*** 
(0.01) 
-0.587*** 
(0.01) 
       
Age 
-0.007 
(.01) 
-0.008 
(.01) 
-0.005 
(.01) 
0.028** 
(.00) 
0.029** 
(.00) 
0.029** 
(.00) 
Education: High school -0.010 
(0.16) 
-0.009 
(0.15) 
-0.006 
(0.15) 
 
-0.024 
(0.11) 
 
-0.026 
(0.11) 
 
-0.027 
(0.11) 
Education: Some college -0.009 
(0.15) 
-0.010 
(0.14) 
-0.010 
(0.14) 
 
0.033 
(0.11) 
 
0.035 
(0.11) 
 
0.035 
(0.11) 
Education: College degree -0.010 
(0.15) 
-0.015 
(0.15) 
-0.011 
(0.14) 
 
0.026 
(0.11) 
 
0.029 
(0.11) 
 
0.029 
(0.11) 
Education: Post-graduate studies 0.001 
(0.16) 
0.002 
(0.15) 
0.004 
(0.15) 
 
0.022 
(0.11) 
 
0.025 
(0.11) 
 
0.024 
(0.11) 
Married -0.004 
(0.06) 
-0.005 
(0.06) 
-0.006 
(0.06) 
 
-0.009 
(0.03) 
 
-0.009 
(0.03) 
 
-0.008 
(0.03) 
Income: $25,000 – $49,999 0.007 
(0.08) 
0.012 
(0.08) 
0.013 
(0.08) 
 
-0.007 
(0.05) 
 
-0.009 
(0.05) 
 
-0.009 
(0.05) 
Income: $50,000 – $74,999 -0.002 
(0.09) 
0.001 
(0.09) 
0.002 
(0.09) 
 
-0.007 
(0.05) 
 
-0.009 
(0.05) 
 
-0.009 
(0.05) 
Income: $75,000 – $99,000 0.041 
(0.10) 
0.040 
(0.11) 
0.040 
(0.11) 
 
0.010 
(0.06) 
 
0.007 
(0.06) 
 
0.007 
(0.06) 
Income: over $100,000 0.031 
(0.11) 
0.032 
(0.11) 
0.033 
(0.11) 
 
0.010 
(0.05) 
 
0.008 
(0.05) 
 
0.008 
(0.05) 
Male  0.039** 
(0.05) 
0.037** 
(0.05) 
0.038** 
(0.05) 
 
0.034*** 
(0.03) 
 
0.036*** 
(0.03) 
 
0.037*** 
(0.03) 
White -0.029 
(0.06) 
-0.028 
(0.07) 
-0.027 
(0.07) 
 
-0.008 
(0.05) 
 
-0.007 
(0.06) 
 
-0.008 
(0.06) 
N 6229 6229 6229 21605 21605 21605 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Payment Instrument Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
F-test (Wald test) 47.93*** 47.45*** 46.89*** 164.14*** 164.14 164.26*** 
Adjusted R-squared  .377 .380 .382 .326 .329 .330 
Note: Marginal effects from OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is individual i’s change in raw 
perception of security of payment j from wave 𝑡 − 1 to wave 𝑡. 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑠,𝑡−1 − 𝑆𝐸𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅−𝑖,𝑗𝑠,𝑡−1 is the difference between 
individual i’s raw perception of security and the average raw perception of security in the state of residence,  census 
region of residence, or national average, as noted. Variables are normalized so that coefficients represent the 
standard deviation changes for a one-standard-deviation-change in the independent variables. Explanatory variables 
are individual characteristics that are thought to be exogenous to perceptions of security such as age, education, 
income, and marital status. Standard errors clustered at individual and payment instrument level are in parentheses. 
Significance at the 5%, and 1% level is indicated by ** and ***. 
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Table 8: Impact of a close friend’s negative safety shock on one’s own overall safety assessment  
 
 Checks Debit Cards Credit Cards Store Value Cards BANP OBBP 
𝑰𝑫 𝑻𝒉𝒆𝒇𝒕𝒊,𝒕(marginal effects) -0.210** -0.161** -0.121 0.030 -0.169** -0.039 
Pr=1 Very Risky 0.008*** 0.010** 0.007 -0.004 0.023** 0.002 
Pr=2 Risky 0.036*** 0.026** 0.017 -0.002 0.016** 0.005 
Pr=3 Neither risky nor secure 0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.001 -0.008** 0.002 
Pr=4 Secure -0.038*** -0.029** -0.019 0.003 -0.024** -0.006 
Pr=5 Very secure -0.009*** -0.008** -0.008 0.002 -0.007** -0.003 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
Age 0.021*** -0.010*** -0.002 -0.001 0.010*** 0.007** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education: High school 0.172 0.447 0.116 -0.032 0.193 0.239 
 
(0.26) (0.24) (0.25) (0.18) (0.22) (0.29) 
Education: Some college -0.251 0.149 0.013 -0.101 0.003 0.401 
 
(0.25) (0.22) (0.24) (0.17) (0.21) (0.28) 
Education: College degree -0.122 0.054 0.367 -0.139 -0.098 0.594** 
 
(0.26) (0.23) (0.24) (0.17) (0.22) (0.28) 
Education: Post-graduate studies -0.050 0.180 0.439 -0.269 0.068 0.481 
 
(0.26) (0.24) (0.25) (0.18) (0.23) (0.29) 
Married -0.027 -0.169** -0.112 -0.116 -0.102 -0.020 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) 
Income: $25,000 – $49,999 -0.005 -0.085 0.072 0.026 -0.172 0.090 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) 
Income: $50,000 – $74,999 -0.061 -0.152 0.097 -0.045 -0.025 0.338** 
 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.14) 
Income: $75,000 – $99,000 0.017 -0.045 0.334** -0.091 0.018 0.431** 
 
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.16) 
Income: over $100,000 -0.135 0.008 0.481*** -0.120 0.065 0.484** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.14) (0.15) 
Male 0.188** 0.279*** 0.343*** 0.191** 0.207** 0.193** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
White 0.164 -0.085 0.274** 0.149 -0.214** 0.068 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.12) 
N 5237 5233 5234 5233 4459 4460 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Individual Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
F-test (Wald test) 158.953*** 123.127*** 185.031*** 70.337*** 185.330*** 72.884*** 
Log-Likelihood -7377.961 -7574.810 -7646.104 -8143.956 -6634.996 -6641.884 
Notes: This table presents coefficient estimates from random-effects ordered logit regressions. Dependent variables reflect the overall perceived safety level of 
payment instruments, taking on a value ranging from 1 (very risky) to 5 (very secure). The dummy identity theft takes on a value of 1 if the individual is well 
acquainted with someone who has been victim of identity theft, and 0 otherwise. Significance at the 5%, and 1% level is indicated by ** and ***.  
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Table 9: An individual’s changes in perceptions of security by distance from peers’ 
perceptions (robustness tests) 
 
 
 
  Dependent Variable: ∆𝑺𝑬𝑪𝒊𝒋𝒔𝒕  
   
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
𝑺𝑬𝑪𝒊,𝒋,𝒔,𝒕−𝟏 − 𝑺𝑬𝑪̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ −𝒊,𝒋,𝒔,𝒕−𝟏 -0.593*** -0.597*** -0.593*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
𝑺𝑬𝑪̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝒋,𝒔,𝒕−𝟏 − 𝑺𝑬𝑪̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝒋,𝒕−𝟏 -0.058*** 
(0.07) 
-0.058*** 
(0.07) 
-0.059*** 
(0.07) 
N 44457 44379 44457 
Year Fixed Effects YES NO NO 
Payment Instrument Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Additional Controls NO YES NO 
F-test (Wald test) 606.2*** 393.7*** 1031.3*** 
Adjusted R-squared  0.344 0.345 0.344 
 
 
Note: Marginal effects from OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is individual i’s change in raw 
perception of security from wave 𝑡 − 1 to wave 𝑡. Variables are normalized so that coefficients represent the 
standard deviation changes for a one-standard-deviation-change in the independent variables. Standard errors 
clustered at individual level are in parentheses. Significance at the 5%, and 1% level is indicated by ** and ***. 
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Table 10: The impact of social spillovers on payment behavior 
 
 
 
Check  Debit Card Credit Card SVC BANP OBBP 
 
Adoption Use Adoption Use Adoption Use Adoption Use Adoption Use Adoption Use 
Security (own) t-1 0.00*  
(1.78) 
0.00  
(0.54) 
0.03***  
(7.59) 
0.02***  
(4.20) 
0.00  
(0.74) 
0.01**  
(2.85) 
-0.00  
(-0.59) 
0.00  
(0.70) 
0.01**  
(3.24) 
0.01  
(1.67) 
0.05***  
(10.45) 
0.01***  
(3.79) 
Security (average state) t-1 0.036**  
(2.58) 
0.01  
(0.89) 
0.03  
(1.29) 
0.05***  
(2.75) 
0.02  
(1.28) 
-0.01  
(-0.76) 
-0.07**  
(-2.23) 
-0.03  
(-1.17) 
-0.03  
(-1.23) 
-0.02  
(-1.19) 
0.04  
(1.83) 
0.02  
(1.51) 
Acceptance t-1 0.00  
(0.48) 
0.01***  
(3.44) 
0.03***  
(4.73) 
0.03***  
(5.77) 
0.01  
(1.74) 
-0.01**  
(-2.57) 
0.00  
(0.52) 
0.00  
(0.65) 
-0.00  
(-0.70) 
0.00  
(0.98) 
0.02**  
(3.04) 
0.01***  
(4.21) 
Cost t-1 0.02***  
(6.05) 
-0.00**  
(-2.27) 
0.05***  
(11.23) 
0.02***  
(3.62) 
0.02***  
(8.07) 
0.05***  
(21.99) 
-0.00  
(-0.54) 
0.00  
(0.10) 
0.04***  
(7.18) 
0.02**  
(2.64) 
0.04***  
(7.78) 
0.01***  
(3.46) 
Convenience t-1 0.01***  
(3.92) 
0.03***  
(16.30) 
0.07***  
(15.65) 
0.09***  
(10.26) 
0.03***  
(8.21) 
0.04***  
(9.82) 
0.01**  
(2.44) 
0.01  
(1.30) 
0.03***  
(5.89) 
0.01**  
(2.90) 
0.09***  
(17.88) 
0.04***  
(5.48) 
Mills Ratio 
 
-0.07***  
(-3.52) 
 
0.13**  
(2.36) 
 
0.12***  
(3.97) 
 
0.13  
(0.84) 
 
0.14**  
(3.41) 
 
0.22***  
(2.38) 
Observations 
Wald Test 
7862 
1768*** 
7852 
855.05*** 
7884 
1308*** 
6080 
181.51*** 
7769 
64.16*** 
7833 
220.62*** 
 
Notes: This table presents coefficient estimates of a Heckman two-step model. Table entries for adoption are the marginal effects estimates from the probit 
regression in the first stage of the Heckman two-step model. The dependent variable in adoption models is set equal to 1 if the respondent has adopted the 
payment type, and 0 otherwise. Table entries for use are coefficient estimates from the second stage of the Heckman selection model. The dependent variable in 
the use models is the share of total payments made with that payment type. The Heckman two-step procedure excludes respondents who have missing values in 
the second stage only if the dependent variable of the first stage is equal to 1, that is, if they had adopted the payment method. Z-statistics are reported in 
parenthesis. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, ** and ***.    
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Appendix  
Positive and negative perceptions: transformation of base specification 
 
Equation (2) in the paper can be shown as: 
 
𝑦 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑋 + 𝛽2𝑁𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽3(𝑋 ∗ 𝑁𝐸𝐺),      (A1) 
 
where X is an independent variable, NEG is a dummy variable, and X*NEG is an interaction 
term.   
 
NEG = 1 if a consumer perceives a payment instrument as riskier than her peers do. 
NEG = 0 if a consumer perceives a payment instrument as more secure than her peers do.   
 
The interaction term in (A1) makes the interpretation of the effect of NEG on y difficult.  
 
In order to interpret the effect more easily, we can split the dummy NEG into two dummy 
variables, the original NEG and a new one called POS (which is the variable NEG=0). For 
example: 
 
Original Variable Transformed Variable 
NEG NEG POS 
1 1 0 
0 0 1 
1 1 0 
0 0 1 
0 0 1 
1 1 0 
1 1 0 
   
We use the new dummies NEG and POS to split the variable X into two groups based on 
whether a consumer perceives an instrument as riskier or more secure than her peers do. It 
will also allow us to see the impact of these two groups on the dependent variable 
separately. 
 
Hence, we can rewrite equation (A1) as follows: 
 
𝑦 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑋⏟
𝛽1(𝑋∗𝑁𝐸𝐺)+ 𝛽1(𝑋∗𝑃𝑂𝑆)
+ 𝛽2𝑁𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽3(𝑋 ∗ 𝑁𝐸𝐺)     
 
𝑦 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑋 ∗ 𝑁𝐸𝐺) + 𝛽1(𝑋 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆) + 𝛽2𝑁𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽3(𝑋 ∗ 𝑁𝐸𝐺).     (A2) 
 
Rearranging terms of equation (A2): 
 
𝑦 = 𝛼 + 𝛽2𝑁𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽1(𝑋 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆) + (𝛽1 + 𝛽3) ∗ (𝑋 ∗ 𝑁𝐸𝐺).      (A3)  
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Equation (A3) above is similar to equation (3) in the paper. Note that there is no 
multicollinearity in the model, because we are not introducing directly the three dummies 
NEG, NEG, POS, but using interactions terms with the independent variable X.  
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Figure A1: Relative security rating of credit cards, by state, 2014 
 
 
Notes: 
1. White indicates insufficient data for the corresponding state 
2. Relative security rating is calculated as a percentile rank among all 50 states and the District of Columbia. 
State averages for each payment instrument in each year are ordered and assigned a number based on the 
following percentiles: 
 1%-20% = 1 (Most Risky) 
 21%-40%=2  
 41%=60%=3 
 61%-80%=4 
 81%-100%=5 (Most Secure) 
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Table A1: Security ratings, by state, 2008–2014 average and standard deviation  
 
 
 
Average, 
2008–2014 
(weighted) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Alaska (AK) 4.60 0.55 
Alabama (AL) 3.57 1.27 
Arizona (AZ) 2.71 1.60 
Arkansas (AR) 2.71 1.11 
California (CA) 2.14 0.90 
Colorado (CO) 2.57 1.27 
Connecticut (CT) 2.29 1.25 
Delaware (DE) 3.14 1.68 
Florida (FL) 3.00 0.82 
Georgia (GA) 2.86 0.69 
Hawaii (HI) 5.00 0.00 
Idaho (ID) 3.14 1.57 
Illinois (IL) 3.29 0.95 
Indiana (IN) 1.71 0.49 
Iowa (IA) 4.43 0.53 
Kansas (KS) 2.57 1.51 
Kentucky (KY) 3.57 1.51 
Louisiana (LA) 2.00 1.15 
Maine (ME) 4.14 0.90 
Maryland (MD) 3.00 1.15 
Massachusetts (MA) 2.57 1.51 
Michigan (MI) 2.57 0.79 
Minnesota (MN) 2.86 1.21 
Mississippi (MS) 3.29 1.60 
Missouri (MO) 2.14 1.07 
Montana (MT) 3.71 1.60 
Nebraska (NE) 3.43 1.40 
Nevada (NV) 3.71 1.38 
New Hampshire (NH) 2.43 1.81 
New Jersey (NJ) 2.57 1.40 
New Mexico (NM) 1.57 0.79 
New York (NY) 2.71 1.25 
North Carolina (NC) 2.71 0.95 
North Dakota (ND) 2.71 1.89 
Ohio (OH) 2.57 1.13 
Oklahoma (OK) 3.43 0.98 
Oregon (OR) 2.57 1.27 
Pennsylvania (PA) 2.57 0.98 
Rhode Island (RI) 2.86 1.86 
South Carolina (SC) 3.29 1.11 
South Dakota (SD) 4.57 0.53 
Tennessee (TN) 2.29 1.25 
Texas (TX) 2.86 1.07 
Utah (UT) 3.00 1.73 
Vermont (VT) 3.43 1.99 
Virginia (VA) 3.43 0.53 
Washington (WA) 2.86 1.35 
West Virginia (WV) 3.57 1.51 
Wisconsin (WI) 1.86 0.90 
Wyoming (WY) 2.50 1.73 
Washington D.C. (WDC) 3.50 1.97 
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics (divergence from peers’ perceptions) 
 
 
 
Payment Instrument Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Check 
Own minus state average security 9,068 .0211 1.108 -3.00 2.82 
State average minus national average 9,122 .0030 0.193 -0.97 1.18 
National average in year t minus national average over all years 13,165 -.0001 0.074 -0.18 0.11 
   
 
   
Debit Card 
Own minus state average security 9,065 -.0030 1.188 -3.50 3.00 
State average minus national average 9,122 -.0004 0.186 -1.15 1.17 
National average in year t minus national average over all years 13,165 -.0001 0.110 -0.17 0.15 
   
 
   
Credit Card 
Own minus state average security 9,067 .0138 1.243 -3.33 3.00 
State average minus national average 9,122 .0018 0.205 -0.98 1.74 
National average in year t minus national average over all years 13,165 -.0002 0.138 -0.24 0.17 
   
 
   
SVC 
Own minus state average security 9,056 .0027 1.311 -3.50 3.33 
State average minus national average 9,122 .0006 0.215 -1.83 1.27 
National average in year t minus national average over all years 13,165 -.0002 0.095 -0.26 0.13 
   
 
   
OBBP 
Own minus state average security 8,213 .0092 1.258 -3.04 2.60 
State average minus national average 8,260 -.0023 0.214 -1.03 1.27 
National average in year t minus national average over all years 12,169 -.0001 0.065 -0.13 0.07 
   
 
   
BANP 
Own minus state average security 8,212 .0024 1.267 -2.47 3.67 
State average minus national average 8,260 .0000 0.196 -1.04 1.06 
National average in year t minus national average over all years 12,169 -.0002 0.152 -0.28 0.17 
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Table A3: Correlation between average raw perception of security and crime indicators (per thousands of individuals) at the 
state level 
 
 
 
 
Raw security assessment   
(checks) 
1 
             
Raw security assessment  
(Debit Cards) 
0.2202 1 
            
Raw security assessment   
(Credit Cards) 
0.3466 0.4501 1 
           
Raw security assessment   
(Stored value Cards) 
0.2079 0.255 -0.0605 1 
          
Raw security assessment   
(OBBP) 
0.1778 0.2137 0.4254 -0.2089 1 
         
Raw security assessment   
(BANP) 
0.4546 0.3951 0.3943 0.0436 0.4056 1 
        
Violent crime  -0.0654 -0.0867 -0.1261 -0.0095 -0.147 -0.0735 1 
Murder and no negligent 
Manslaughter 
-0.066 -0.0767 -0.1262 -0.0103 -0.1663 -0.0701 0.9771 1 
       
Forcible rape -0.0673 -0.0707 -0.1227 0.0097 -0.1367 -0.0855 0.9345 0.9212 1 
      
Robbery -0.0524 -0.0968 -0.1256 -0.0214 -0.1359 -0.0741 0.9789 0.9698 0.9002 1 
     
Aggravated assault -0.0709 -0.0804 -0.1235 -0.0043 -0.15 -0.0703 0.9934 0.9615 0.9252 0.9499 1 
    
Property crime total -0.0816 -0.0658 -0.1184 -0.0024 -0.1338 -0.0802 0.9668 0.9557 0.9592 0.9408 0.9584 1 
   
Burglary -0.0802 -0.0467 -0.1073 0.01 -0.1347 -0.0841 0.9406 0.9347 0.9467 0.904 0.9375 0.9879 1 
  
Larceny-theft -0.0735 -0.0682 -0.1185 -0.0019 -0.1352 -0.0735 0.9602 0.9463 0.9552 0.9321 0.9529 0.996 0.9779 1 
 
Motor vehicle theft -0.1159 -0.0811 -0.1226 -0.0292 -0.1036 -0.0977 0.9122 0.9074 0.8647 0.9223 0.8881 0.8981 0.8725 0.8641 1 
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Table A4: New adopters model probit regressions (marginal effects) 
 
 Checks Debit Card Credit card SVC BANP OBBP 
Security (own) t-1 0.037** 0.021** -0.009 -0.003 0.020** 0.034*** 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Security (average state) t 0.247*** 0.053 -0.014 -0.071** 0.006 0.072** 
  (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
Acceptance t-1 -0.023 0.001 -0.013 0.001 -0.024** 0.002 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cost t-1 0.019 0.021** 0.013 0.007 0.019* 0.007 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Convenience t-1 -0.012 0.021* 0.016 -0.003 0.013 0.036*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age: 25–34 (base category)           
              
Age: 35–44   -0.048 -0.047 -0.006 0.063** -0.002 -0.095*** 
  (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
Age: 45–54 0.034 0.032 -0.039 0.047* 0.087* -0.107*** 
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Age: 55–64 -0.035 -0.031 -0.060* 0.024 -0.014 -0.108*** 
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
Age: 65+ -0.080 -0.102* -0.017 -0.015 0.045 -0.185*** 
  (0.11) (0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) 
Education: Less than high school (base category)           
              
Education: High school  0.076 0.058 0.011 -0.156*** -0.022 0.051 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) 
Education: Some college 0.130** 0.097* 0.035 -0.114** 0.056 0.108*** 
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) 
Education: College 0.111 0.145** 0.051 -0.110* 0.107 0.100** 
  (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) 
Education: Post-graduate studies 0.350*** 0.100 0.057 -0.073 0.075 0.082** 
  (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.04) 
Married (base category)           
              
Separated -0.101** -0.036 -0.020 -0.028 0.014 0.009 
  (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
Widowed -0.064 -0.103** -0.025 0.028 0.074 -0.025 
  (0.15) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) 
Single -0.045 -0.045 -0.038 -0.043* -0.031 -0.007 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
Number of Household Members -0.000 0.013 -0.009 0.003 0.010 0.008 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Ethnicity: Latino -0.129** 0.044 -0.028 0.064 -0.075 0.099** 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) 
Race: White (base category)           
              
Race: Black -0.044 0.030 -0.044* -0.000 -0.059 -0.020 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
Race: Asian 0.152 0.259* -0.089 0.080 0.055 0.077 
  (0.17) (0.15) (0.09) (0.06) (0.12) (0.06) 
Race: Other 0.229*** 0.082 0.002 -0.003 0.025 -0.056 
  (0.08) (0.09) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) 
Male -0.035 -0.014 0.023 -0.020 -0.034 0.006 
  (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Income: Less than $25,000 (base category)           
              
Income: $25,000–49,999 0.056 0.073** 0.048* -0.051** 0.128*** 0.015 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
Income: $50,000–74,999 0.055 -0.007 0.119*** -0.039 0.161*** 0.041* 
  (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) 
Income: $75,000–99,999 0.096 -0.025 0.089 -0.027 0.136*** 0.060* 
  (0.10) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
Income: $100,000 or more 0.218** 0.007 0.162*** -0.016 0.160*** 0.078** 
  (0.11) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
Retired 0.042 -0.043 -0.026 -0.037 -0.057 0.042 
  (0.10) (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) 
Unemployed -0.061 -0.044 0.008 0.036 -0.025 -0.031 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Bill Pay Financial Responsibility 0.010 0.001 0.009 -0.000 -0.001 -0.005 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Own Primary Home -0.035 0.096*** -0.041 0.009 -0.036 -0.026 
  (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
2011.wave -0.173*** 0.004 0.115*** 0.048**   0.022 
  (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)   (0.02) 
2012.wave -0.175*** 0.007 0.071** 0.091*** -0.006 -0.004 
  (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
2013.wave -0.244*** -0.052 0.235*** 0.013 -0.040 0.019 
  (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
2014.wave -0.188*** -0.008 0.057* 0.042* -0.001 -0.012 
  (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Observations 565 1,617 1,309 4,511 1,770 3,432 
Notes: Table entries are the marginal effects estimates from the probit regressions. The dependent variable is set equal to 1 if 
the respondent is a new adopter in t of a particular payment type (conditional on having being a nonadopter in t–1). 
Otherwise, it equals 0. All variables are lagged one period. Standard errors reported in parenthesis. Significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, ** and ***.   
 
